Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Cpa)
The process led to the following agreements (also called protocols): I will argue that in the situation in South Sudan, there is almost no hope of peace, let alone necessary reforms without strong international participation. Without this, none of the independent bodies or experts, civil society or other inclusion instruments advocated in the agreement will have a voice and power. But the JMEC, which is mainly supported by IGAD, may not be able to fulfill this role. First, IGAD itself is divided. Sudan and Uganda have competing interests and have waged a proxy war in South Sudan during this period. Ethiopia and Kenya disagree on the peace process. Many countries within IGAD have both economic interests and arms sales, interests that run counter to IGAD`s strong actions, such as .B. the demand for an arms embargo or the obligation to impose economic sanctions on the parties if they do not comply with their agreements. Other African governments involved in the process have often polluted the waters with competing peace processes such as the Arusha one and have their own vested interests. After all, only one of IGAD`s members, Kenya, is a true democracy. To what extent will IGAD be determined to push through a truly democratic transition in South Sudan? 1.2. The Parties shall always refrain from any action that may affect the peace process in any way. They must constantly create and maintain an atmosphere conducive to peace and tranquility; Following the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the Presidency is urgently launching a peace and reconciliation process for Abyei, which is committed to harmony and peaceful coexistence in the region.
15.5. The Parties agree that the presence and scope of the United Nations Peace Support Mission shall be determined by the timetable for the implementation of this Convention (withdrawal, disarmament, redeployment, etc.) and shall expire gradually after the successful implementation of the timetables, confidence-building and the commitment of the Parties to implement this Agreement. But there is no peace. Sudan remains involved in internal wars in South Kordofan, Blue Nile and Darfur and has again been drawn into the conflict in South Sudan. South Sudan has sunk into a civil war with immense loss and suffering. I very much appreciate the honour of speaking today at the Peace Research Institute of the University of Khartoum. The American Institute for Peace, with which I am associated, is dedicated, like the PRI, to ending violent conflict and promoting peace. I think we all agree that these goals are often out of our reach.
In Sudan and South Sudan, despite years of intensive negotiations, numerous agreements and the dedicated work of so many people, peace is not only elusive, but in South Sudan and parts of Sudan it has been completely lost. Nevertheless, we cannot despair or withdraw from this work. Too many people are suffering, too much potential is lost, there is too much danger of an even greater loss of life that we need to intensify our work, if at all. I therefore welcome the opportunity for our two institutes to be in close contact to see how we can intensify our efforts for peace. The Joint Media Committee was established in April 2005 to promote understanding of peace processes. The committee included representatives from both sides of the CPA. The Committee did not meet regularly and UNMIS` efforts to secure the support of the Public Awareness Committee were unsuccessful.1 Nevertheless, the agreement between the Government of the Sudan and UNMIS on 28 December 2005 gave UNMIS the “right to establish, install and operate United Nations radio stations under its exclusive control, disseminate information about his mandate to the Sudanese public.” 2 Programmes broadcast on UNMIS radio stations shall be free from any form of censorship. On 11 October 2007, the SPLM withdrew from the Government of National Unity (UNOG) and accused the central government of violating the terms of the APC. In particular, the SPLM notes that the Khartoum-based government, dominated by the National Congress Party, has failed to withdraw more than 15,000 troops from the southern oil fields and has failed to implement the Protocol on Abyei. The SPLM said it would not return to war, while analysts noted that the agreement had collapsed for some time, particularly due to the international community`s focus on the conflict in neighboring Darfur.
[2] The SPLM announced that it would join the government on December 13, 2007 following an agreement. The agreement stipulates that the seat of government will rotate every three months between Juba and Khartoum, although it seems that this will be largely symbolic, as will the funding of a census (crucial for the referendum) and a timetable for the withdrawal of troops from across the border. [3] It was reported that members of other armed groups who had joined the peace process had been admitted to the civil service.1 The Ministry of Energy also reported that it had provided the NCSC with a list of vacancies to be filled by citizens of South Sudan.2 At the end of 2009, it had been reported that the Presidency had approved 1,150 South Sudanese candidates for appointment to the national civil service. In addition, South Kordofan State formed a special committee in November 2009 to facilitate the integration of 1,708 SPLM officials into the political and administrative structure of the state.3 Given that the appointment of 700 Southerners in 2008 was expected to meet the 10 per cent of civil service posts, it can be said that the provisions of the agreement on civil service reform have been implemented. Both sides imposed restrictions on UN freedom of movement in Abyei in 2005.11 This was a violation of the ceasefire agreement, although no hostilities were reported between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SPF) and the Sudan People`s Liberation Army (SPLA). The 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement provides for the establishment of a United Nations Peace Support Mission to monitor and review this Agreement and to support the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in accordance with Chapter VI of the Charter of the United Nations. The PCA anticipates that the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Commission will be headed by the Commander of the United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS). United Nations observers should have full access for the purpose of monitoring ceasefire activities, as provided for in the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA).
The PCA also provided that the Verification and Monitoring Team (VMT), the Joint Military Commission (JMC) in the Nuba Mountains and the Protection of Civilians Monitoring Team (CPMT) would continue their tasks until the UN mission is operational. But there is an echo of the CPA here. Although the scope of the agreement is broad, the international community is not in a position to implement it. Responsibility for implementing much of this reform has largely been shifted to the two leaders, whose competition for power has sparked the conflict. There is little reason to believe that both are engaged in such reform, especially if it limits their future ambitions. Although other positions in unity government have been allocated, their true power is questionable. What has happened is that in the development of this peace process, the focus on comprehensive reforms has gradually given way just to end the fighting, bring the two competing leaders to the table and agree on a unity government (again, because that is what existed in practice before). In the underlying competition between fundamental reform and the focus on “boys with weapons”, the understandable but deplorable failure of the latter has been failure. Just as APC observers have focused on ongoing crises and problems between the North and the South rather than the internal reform process, IGAD in South Sudan has taken similar steps to focus primarily on ending the fighting, even if that means putting power back in the hands of those who started it. 17.7.
The JDB is responsible for developing a comprehensive framework for confidence-building. .
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