Define Moral Disagreement
The crude relativism that places morality in the rules of a group, whatever they may be, poses many problems. It captures some, but not all, of the characteristics described by Wong that would make morality objective, and in this regard it reflects some of our shared moral experiences. He also has a story to tell about moral disagreements. Still, there are just as many ideas (and the consequences of its conservation), which is very counterintuitive – it comes with a lot of “heavy luggage”. This may sound like a moral theory, as it provides an explanation of the nature and source of morality. In fact, many of those who claim the thesis seem to think that this is how it works. But this is more of an attitude against theorization, as it interrupts any chance of telling another principled story about how moral rules should be explained, systematized, or otherwise made meaningful. Crude relativism insists on a radically contingent structure in our local moral systems, if we recognize any structure. Perhaps worst of all, this crude version, especially with its thesis of tolerance, categorically contradicts itself and is self-destructive. 39 There are at least two interpretations of the latter view, one stronger and the other weaker. The strongest would say that desire fails whenever it is guided by something other than moral value, an absurd vision. The weaker would only say that he is ill-advised if he does not attach sufficient weight to moral value. This may be consistent with some common ideas, but I will not attach any weight to it.
The fact that different theorists ultimately have different ideas about what moral disagreement equals suggests that they may talk to each other while discussing other issues. B such as the extent of the disagreement and how to explain it. Note, however, that the disputes in question take place at a fairly theoretical level and coincide with considerable overlap over what is considered a paradigmatic case of moral disagreement and what behaviors these disagreements typically manifest. For example, realists, non-cognitivists, and others may agree that moral disagreements usually accompany conflicts of desires and are often causally rooted in conflicts of non-moral beliefs (e.g., with respect to the consequences of actions). This overlap helps to establish a common theme for discussions on the extent of disagreements. Now let`s move on to the disagreement between Sally and Bob. I am somehow offended by “we are the ancient Greeks”; I am careful not to agree with Western morality whenever it is bad, and I have no reason to believe that the resulting distribution of errors is aimed at aligning with Western morality. If you meant “most of them are the ancient Greeks,” then of course. Similar objections may be raised against other forms of relativism, although it may be easier for some of them to interpret cases of moral disagreement as conflicts of faith than for others. For example, in a kind of relativistic view, what a speaker claims by saying that an action is right is, roughly, that it is permissible by its moral standards. So if the speaker`s claim is rejected by someone who shares these norms, then they end up having irreconcilable beliefs (on this point, see Harman 1978; and López de Sa 2015).
However, disagreements between people who do not share the norms have not yet been taken into account. This type of challenge, in turn, can take different forms. An easy way to argue that an argument is self-destructive is to show that its proponents use safeguards for allegations that are completely inconsistent with it (i.e., its conclusion or premises). Consider, for example, an argument to establish the theoretical thesis of error that all moral claims are false. If this argument can be extended to metaethics, so that it forces its proponents to think that all metaethic claims are equally false (including the theory of error), then they have obviously ended up in an unpleasant place. “On the contrary, it is essential for the concept of morality that it includes standards common to all perfectly reasonable agents. In response to such objections, relativists may distance themselves from the idea that moral disagreement essentially involves a conflict of faith, and instead adopt the non-cognitive view, which views these disagreements as clashes of conativistic attitudes. They may do so, for example, by assuming that a person`s moral standards are such attitudes (see, for example.B. Wong 1984; Dreier, 1999; Björnsson and Finlay 2010 and Marques 2014).
This would allow them to describe the situation with Jane and Eric as a real moral dispute, even if they admit that Jane and Eric`s statements about the morality of eating meat may both be true. One might think that a relativist who chooses this path has little reason to remain a cognitivist. But there are other forms of relativism that allow for other options. I should put this statement into perspective: “As such, we shouldn`t expect much more moral agreement from people than rational (or almost rational) AIs.” Or Bob might believe that God`s Word determines moral truth and that God forbade abortion in the Bible. Then, Bob makes metaethic mistakes that cause his mind to not function properly in a very general way and add moral generalizations to his pool of beliefs, which he wouldn`t do if true knowledge of the universe destroyed his current and incoherent metaethics. Quick correction: s / abstract rational reasoning / abstract moral reasoning / I don`t see how Eliezer can adapt to this. For his reason, what Bob claimed is true, that abortion is forbidden by morality_Bob standards. How can Sally disagree? There is no doubt (we can assume) that abortion is actually banned by morality_Bob. .
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